



# Invetter: Locating Insecure Input Validations in Android Services

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    - 漏洞挖掘
  - 最关心的问题
    - 0 DAY你在哪儿
  - 目前战绩
    - ... ...



移动安全



区块链安全

# System Services of Android

- Perform sensitive operations
  - Window service, Location service, Notification service, etc.

Phone service



Network service



Location service




SMS service



# Motivation

Android enforces a set of **access controls** to manage sensitive resources

**Security flaws** in the access controls make them vulnerable to illegal access



# State of the art

- Permission validation is well studied
  - Kratos: Discovering Inconsistent Security Policy Enforcement in the Android Framework. NDSS (2016).
  - Harvesting Inconsistent Security Configurations in Customized Android Roms via Differential Analysis. USENIX (2016).
  - AceDroid: Normalizing Diverse Android Access Control Checks for Inconsistency Detection. NDSS(2018)
  - ... ...


However, an unstudied research area :

**Input validation of Android services ?**

# Android Input Validation

```
if(inputData == "android"){
    //do sensitive operation
} else {
    throw new SecurityException("...");
}

if(isBlackListed(inputData)){
    throw new
        SecurityException(" ...");
}
```



```
if(checkCaller(inputData)){
    return Mode_Allowed;
}


if(!checkPolicy(inputData)){
    recycle();
    return;
}

if(isSystemApp(inputData)){
    log("illegal access");
    return;
}
```

- Our work
  - The first study of the secure use of **sensitive input validations** in Android framework


# Locating Sensitive Input Validation is Difficult

- Unstructured
  - Any parameter may lead to a sensitive input validation
  - Various text strings in parameter



# Locating Sensitive Input Validation is Difficult

- Ill-defined
  - No documentation
  - No system interface




# Locating Sensitive Input Validation is Difficult

- Fragmented
  - Any system service (Java class)
  - Any public interface
  - Any branch statement
- In Android 7.0,
  - 6 Java classes for permission validation
  - vs*
  - 173 Java classes for input validation


# Input Validation can be Vulnerable

- Confusions about system security model
  - Incorrectly trusting app supplied data



# Input Validation can be Vulnerable

- Confusions about system security model
  - Incorrectly trusting code in the app process



# Input Validation can be Vulnerable

- Weakened validations in customization

```
if( wouldToggleZenMode( ringerMode)&&
checkCallerIsSystemOrSamePackage(caller)&& checkAccessPolicy( caller))
{
    throw new SecurityException(...)
}

setRingerMode( ringerMode, caller ...)
```

Customization

AOSP image  
(version 6.0)

NO CHECK


```
setRingerMode( ringerMode, caller ...)
```

.....

3rd party image

# Methodology Design


```
## SystemServiceExample.java
public void onTransact(input ... ){
    if( !isSystemPackageName(input.packageName) )
        throw new SecurityException("Not a system app");
    if( !isValidMode(input.type) ){
        log("illegal type: "+input.type);
        return;
    }
    //sensitive operation
    //lots of code snippets
    ...
    if( !checkData(input.data) ){
        warn("wrong data : "+input.data);
        return;
    }
    ...
}
```



# Methodology Design

```
## SystemServiceExample.java
public void onTransact(input ... ){
    if( !isSystemPackageName(input.packageName) )
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    }
    ...
}
```

input validation



# Structural Analysis

- Recognize input validation
  - Key Insight : Input validation terminates its normal execution when the validation fails
  - Termination branch
    - Throw exception ✓ Throw new SecurityException(...)
    - Return constant ✓ Return Mode\_Allowed
    - Log and return ✓ Log.warn(...)
    - Recycle and Return ✓ Recycle()

# Methodology Design

```
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    }
    ...
}
```

Known sensitive input validation

Adjacent input validation

Non-adjacent input validation will be ignored

## Android Framework




## Structural Analysis



## Input validation



## Learning based Recognition



## Vulnerability Discovery




Input validation

Sensitive input validations

# Learning Based Recognition

- Recognize sensitive input validation
  - Key Insight : Sensitive input validations are likely to be verified together
  - Association rule mining
    - If one input validation is adjacent to a sensitive input validation, it is sensitive with a high possibility
    - Known sensitive input validations -> unknown sensitive input validations



# Methodology Design

```
## SystemServiceExample.java
public void onTransact(input ... ){
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    if( !isValidMode(input.type){
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        return;
    }
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    //lots of code snippets
    ...
    if( !checkData(input.data){
        warn("wrong data : "+input.data);
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    }
    ...
}
```




*Use input as caller identity*

## Android Framework



## Structural Analysis

Input validation



## Learning based Recognition

Sensitive input validations

## Insecure Model




## Vulnerability Discovery

# Vulnerability Discovery


- Insecure model
  - Rule a : Incorrectly trusting app-supplied data
    - App Input -> caller identity
  - Rule b : Incorrectly trusting code in the app process
    - Input validation in Android SDK and not in Android Service
  - Rule c : Weaken validations in customized images
    - Inconsistent validations



(a) Incorrectly trusting app-supplied data



(b) Incorrectly trusting code in the app process




(c) Weakened sensitive input validation in customized images

# Vulnerability Discovery

- Static Analysis
  - Implemented on Soot, with about 12,000 lines of Java code
  - Java byte-code level
  - Optimization for Path sensitive analysis
    - Reduce irrelevant nodes
    - Reduce privileged nodes

- Github :
  - <https://github.com/zzzxxxxIII/Invetter-os>



# Evaluation

- Overall
  - Statistics about analysis target (on average)
    - 100+ system services
    - 15,000+ java classes
    - 200,000+ if statements
  - CentOS 7 server, with four 8-core 2.0GHz CPUs and 192 GB memory
- Data set
  - 4 AOSP images
    - AOSP 7.1, 7.0, 6.0, 5.0, (AOSP 8.0)
  - 4 customized images
    - Xiaomi Note2 (6.0), Huawei P9(7.0), Huawei Mate9(7.0), Samsung S6(5.0),  
(Xiaomi Mix2(8.0), Huawei P10(8.0))

# Result

- Performance
  - 11.8 hours for 8 images
  - 85 minutes on average
- Precision
  - 103 possible insecure input validations
  - TP = 86
  - Exploitable = 20
- Real World Attacks
  - Privilege escalation = 17
  - Log overflow = 1
  - Privacy leakage = 2
- Demos are illustrated in the online video :
  - [https://youtu.be/erLY\\_OMi4kQ](https://youtu.be/erLY_OMi4kQ).

# Case Study 1

- Sending arbitrary accessibility event
  - AccessibilityManagerService
  - Use app input to verify caller identity
  - Any app can craft an event with a faked package name

Talkback

Notification  
Manager

Text to Voice


Password  
Autofilling

App  
Auto-installing

Browser Url  
Autofilling

# Case Study 2

- Stealthy phishing attack
  - WindowManagerService
  - Inconsistent validations in two execution paths
  - Allow a malware to create crafted Toast message with arbitrary scope of view space



# Conclusion

- Invetter
  - A novel technique for identifying insecure input validations
  - Extend scope for finding more authorization vulnerabilities in Android Framework
- Evaluation on 8 Android images in the wild
  - 20 Input-based vulnerabilities in Android system services
  - Weakened access controls in Android customization

# 超越



再前进一步就是超越

# 快到碗里来！

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  - 网络安全
  - 二进制安全
- 实验室战队:
  - CTF战队: 白泽

# Thanks !

## Q&A

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